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DISCOURSE NORMS AS DEFAULT 
RULES: STRUCTURING CORPORATE 
SPEECH TO MULTIPLE 
STAKEHOLDERS 
David G. Yosifon†
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article analyzes corporate speech problems through the 
framework of corporate law. The focus here is on the “discourse 
norms” that regulate corporate speech to various corporate stakehold-
ers, including shareholders, workers, and consumers. I argue that 
these “discourse norms” should be understood as default terms in the 
“nexus-of-contracts” that comprises the corporation. Having reviewed 
the failure of corporate law as it bears on the interests of non-
shareholding stakeholders such as workers and consumers, I urge the 
adoption of prescriptive discourse norms as an approach to reforming 
corporate governance in a socially useful manner.  
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“Truth is mighty and will prevail. There is nothing the matter 
with this, except that it ain’t so.”1
-- Mark Twain 
 
“I have heard it broached that orders should be given in 
great new ships by electric telegraph. I admire machinery as 
much as any man, and am as thankful to it as any man can be 
for what it does for us. But it will never be a substitute for the 
face of a man, with his soul in it, encouraging another man to 
be brave and true. Never try it for that. It will break down like 
a straw.”2
-- Charles Dickens  
      
“It is only the Board that this in the end can come 
from.”3
-- Michael Jensen  
  
  
 1 MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 345 (Harper & Brothers 1935).  
 2 Charles Dickens, The Wreck of the Golden Mary, HOUSEHOLD WORDS, 
Dec. 25, 1856 at 10 (1856). 
 3 Michael C. Jensen, Professor of Bus. Admin., Harvard Bus. Sch., Presen-
tation at the Stanford Law School: Beyond Agency Theory: The Hidden and Hereto-
fore Inaccessible Power of Integrity (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/2010/02/11/beyond-agency-theory-the-hidden-and-
heretofore-inaccessible-power-of-integrity/. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The destructive influence of corporate speech can be seen in many 
public policy problems. Examples abound, but are highly salient in the 
area of public health. The tobacco epidemic of the twentieth century, 
the obesity epidemic’s ravages so far this century, massive environ-
mental degradation—these problems and more have been catalyzed by 
the combination of corporate political speech in the regulatory arena, 
and corporate commercial speech in the marketplace.4 Solutions to the 
problem of corporate speech have long been wanting. Recently, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission that corporate political speech cannot be muzzled by 
government regulation.5 Since the 1970s the Supreme Court has also 
given substantial constitutional protection to commercial speech, and 
there is little reason to expect a reversal of this orientation on the 
Court.6
Of course, in addition to its destructive power, corporate speech 
has also contributed to human flourishing. For example, commercial 
speech was instrumental in circulating information about the availabil-
ity and use of birth control, which many scholars argue has been an 
important part of the struggle for freedom and equality in our society.
   
7 
Nevertheless, there is widespread concern that corporate speech rou-
tinely impedes the development of sound public policy. Here I pursue 
the theoretical case that we do indeed have a corporate speech prob-
lem,8
  
 4 See David Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS. L. REV. 253, 270-81 (2009) [hereinafter The Consumer Interest in Corporate 
Law] (reviewing case studies of social problems relating to corporate activity in con-
sumer markets, including tobacco, junk food, and dietary supplements); see also 
David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental 
Crime and the Criminal Law, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (reviewing lapse of 
environmental safeguards that contributed to the severity of the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740567.  
 and I explore a possible solution to the problem which does not 
 5 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 6 See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First 
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587 (2000) (arguing that the Court has trended to-
wards ever greater protection for commercial speech and that an intensification of that 
trend should be expected).  
 7 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 422 
(1994); Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y 139, 142-152 (2006). 
 8 See David Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Cor-
porate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) [hereinafter The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law] (on file with au-
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require the kind of corporate censorship that the Supreme Court has 
disallowed on First Amendment grounds. 
Specifically, I argue that corporate speech can be usefully re-
formed by altering corporate law. I argue for the institutionalization of 
firm governance dynamics which will change the way that corpora-
tions speak to and about their shareholders, workers, consumers, the 
community at large, and government. This approach seeks to solve the 
corporate speech problem by generating more socially useful corpo-
rate speech, rather than constraining or silencing it through external 
governmental regulation.   
I. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE SPEECH 
A. The Source of Corporate Power 
While many organisms communicate, the human ability to deploy 
elaborate expressive and representational systems in a community of 
similarly capable individuals is among the defining attributes of our 
species.9
Corporations are powerful institutions because they can efficiently 
coordinate the activity of many individuals and groups, including 
holders of capital, workers, and consumers.
 In the longue duree of human history speech has played a 
crucial part in our ability to achieve the coordination necessary to 
build and maintain civilization. This is not to say that speech explains 
it all—sheer force, inexpressible love, the tides, the winds, the will, all 
of these are also essential components of the human condition. But 
speech is an important category in any conception of the important 
elements of human life. In contemporary society, the corporation is 
among the most significant institutions that organizes, produces, cir-
culates and listens to speech acts. 
10 This capacity for coor-
dination is generated by the corporation’s centralized, authoritative 
decision-making structure.11
  
thor) (arguing that the public choice problems caused by corporate political speech 
undermines the social utility of the shareholder primacy norm in corporate gover-
nance). 
 The corporation’s board of directors 
makes all decisions about how the resources brought by each group 
will be deployed. Various stakeholders all accede to the boards’ deci-
 9 See P. Lieberman, On Human Speech, Syntax, and Language, 3 HUMAN 
EVOLUTION 3 (1988) (providing overview of importance of speech to the development 
of human societies).  
 10 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) 
(arguing that firms develop when the costs of organizing production by fiat are less 
than the costs of discovering prices and coordinating transactions in spot markets). 
 11 See generally STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008) (explicating director primacy theory). 
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sions, or else they do no business with the firm. The coordinating 
power of the board is a beautiful thing. The consumer who wakes in 
the morning desiring an internet-ready cell phone need not drive down 
the street looking for electronic engineers, designers, and program-
mers with whom she might set up a meeting to talk about producing 
the item in exchange for her cash. The coal miner need not say each 
morning to some holder of capital that she is skilled in the hefting of 
the pick and knows a good place for digging, the two then writing a 
contract over breakfast regarding what land should be purchased for 
digging on that afternoon. Instead labor and capital both submit their 
particular assets to the centralized decision-making structure of the 
firm, which deploys the labor and capital in the most beneficial way, 
returning wages and profits to labor and capital far greater than either 
could have generated on their own. The consumer is offered a pre-
designed, internet-ready phone on a take-it-or-leave-it basis at a speci-
fied price, undoubtedly cheaper than she could have come up with on 
her own.12
The authoritative decision-making advantage of the firm, brilliant 
as it is, also constitutes one of the corporation’s greatest design flaws. 
Having turned over control of their assets to the board of directors, the 
firm’s stakeholders are beset with the problem of holding the board of 
directors accountable. This is the agency problem: how do you ensure 
that corporate directors (agents) operate faithfully on behalf of their 
stakeholders, rather than in directors’ own interests through general 
malingering or outright stealing of corporate assets?
  
13
The prevailing view is that different stakeholders should get dif-
ferent solutions to the agency problem. Shareholders require the ex-
clusive fiduciary attention of directors inside the corporate boardroom 
because of their (the shareholders) distance from firm operations. 
Workers, in comparison, are physically present on the shop floor and 
can therefore monitor and negotiate the terms of their labor them-
selves, individually or collectively. Consumers are present at the  
cash-register and can monitor their interest in corporate activity by 
inspecting the goods, services, and prices offered. In sum, the agency  
problem is managed for shareholders by imposing fiduciary obliga-
tions to shareholders on the board of directors, while the agency prob-
lem for workers and consumers is managed primarily by particula-
  
  
 12 Thus, it should be seen that the corporation is a nexus-of-contracts—a set 
of relationships—it is not an “entity,” and it is not a single of piece of property that is 
“owned” by shareholders. See id. at 32-35. 
 13 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (providing the seminal statement of the 
agency problem in corporate law). 
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rized terms in specific contracts on a negotiated or take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. Where workers and consumers are vulnerable and cannot pro-
tect their interests through contract, corporate theory calls for such 
vulnerabilities to be solved through external governmental regulation 
such as labor laws and consumer protection statutes, rather than 
through any departure from shareholder primacy in firm governance.14
Corporate law theorists contend that this organizational design is 
in the best interest of capital, labor, and consumers. It is therefore the 
regime that these stakeholders would voluntarily agree to if they sat 
down and negotiated the matter (or at least it is the regime they would 
all agree to after hearing a lecture on shareholder primacy theory).
 
15
  
 14 Space considerations prelude me from providing a comprehensive rehear-
sal of shareholder primacy theory. Nevertheless, the basic version recounted here 
should suffice as an introduction to the problem of corporate speech, which is the 
subject of this Article. The agency problem for shareholders is actually solved 
through three basic mechanisms: the law of fiduciary obligation, administrative regu-
lation of securities trading, and the invisible, disciplining hand of the market. Many 
would argue that the market is the most crucial mechanism that solves the sharehold-
ers’ agency problem. If a firm’s stock price is low investors will sell or be loath to 
purchase new issues, thus threatening the job or status security of incumbent directors 
and officers. The shares of underperforming firms will be undervalued in the securi-
ties markets, creating opportunities for raiders (or “liberators,” depending on your 
perspective) to purchase a controlling interest in the firm, install new management, 
and reap the rewards of superior performance. The threat of such raiding (or liberat-
ing) keeps incumbent directors working hard, which solves the agency problem for 
shareholders. Nevertheless, because corporate law allows directors to establish struc-
tural defenses against hostile takeovers, even to the extent that such efforts forestall 
the disciplining power of the market for control, the fiduciary obligation of directors 
to shareholders remains a pivotal element of shareholder protections. See 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 105-53. For a fuller version, and more general critique, 
of shareholder primacy theory, see The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, supra 
note 4, at 255-83 and The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.  
 
But these groups do not actually negotiate and plan the design them-
selves. To do so would be as transactionally-burdensome as driving 
down the street looking for a designer to build an internet phone. In-
stead, the basic organizational design is incorporated by law into  
corporate charters as an “off-the-rack” ready-made system. Users of 
corporate charters are free to delete default corporate governance pro-
visions and replace them with some other schema, perhaps one in 
 15 In his recent monograph on director primacy, Stephen Bainbridge invites 
us to imagine corporate law coming out of a meeting between the parties to the corpo-
rate contract around a hypothetical “conference table.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 
31. But urging us to think of corporate law as coming out of a conference room in-
vites us to forget one of the most important elements of the nexus of contracts con-
ception, and that is that these are not negotiated terms. The “poetic” nature of the 
“conference table” abstraction should be highlighted rather than obscured when we 
talk about corporate law in theory and practice.  
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which important corporate decisions are submitted directly to a vote 
by all stakeholders. In practice this does not happen. Corporate stake-
holders stick with the default rules of directorial authority and share-
holder primacy for one of two reasons. First, maybe it really is the 
rule that stakeholders would settle on if they designed the corporate 
governance structure themselves, so there is no impetus to change it. 
Second, stakeholders may stick with the default rule because they find 
it prohibitively costly, in terms of time, intelligence, and logistics, to 
negotiate an alternative arrangement. Thus, they stick with the default 
because they are stuck with it.16
For reasons I explore below, corporate law’s purported solutions 
to the agency problem leave non-shareholding stakeholders vulnerable 
to manipulation and exploitation by corporations acting on behalf of 
shareholders. Here I will focus in particular on non-shareholder’s sus-
ceptibility to the adverse influence of corporate speech. To track this 
influence, I explore the distinct discourse norms that attend corporate 
speech to different corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, 
workers, and consumers. I contend that these discourse norms should 
themselves be regarded as default rules of corporate law, and I argue 
that the discourse norm defaults should be altered in order to improve 
corporate operation for non-shareholding stakeholders. My focus on 
discourse norms provides a heretofore unexcavated foothold in the 
quest for a post-shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance. 
  
B. Discourse Norms and Corporate Law 
1. Discourse Norms and Speech Generally 
By “discourse norms,” I am referring to the practical and moral 
expectations that give semantic value to speech acts. I also mean the 
phrase “discourse norms” to refer to people’s conscious or subcons-
cious expectations about how they should be talking in particular cir-
cumstances.17
  
 16 Social psychologists refer to the sticky default phenomena as the “endow-
ment effect.” See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Criti-
cal Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 41-42 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter The Situational Character] (reviewing endowment effect); see also KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 16-18 (2006) (recognizing the stickiness of defaults in 
corporate law).  
 Discourse norms, like norms generally, are associated 
 17 Donald Langevoort describes part of what I have in mind when I refer to 
“discourse norms,” when he speaks of the “regulati[on ] [of] human and organization 
discourse: who determines what meaning can properly be drawn from what someone 
says or does not say, and with what sort of guidance for making hard judgments about 
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with behavioral expectations that can be regulated both legally and 
extra-legally, both formally and informally.18
Discourse norms can be identified and distinguished by examin-
ing the significance of speech acts in different contexts. Consider for 
example a hypothetical circumstance in which President Bill Clinton, 
in the private family quarters of the White House, tells his wife Hil-
lary that there “is no sexual relationship” with a particular intern in the 
Office of the President.
 
19
  
what was meant.” Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Infe-
rences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 124 (1999). 
 Suppose it was the case that Bill had in fact 
engaged in extensive sexual activity with the intern over a period of 
many months, but that there had been no such encounter for several 
months before he said “there is no sexual relationship” to his wife. 
Norms refer to shared expectations about what the use of particular 
words, phrases, and sentences in particular contexts mean. Under the 
discourse norms of family discussion, Bill’s statement pretty clearly 
counts as a lie. It at least counts as “misleading” in a way that invites 
condemnation and reform, if Bill and his wife are to remain in the 
relationship of marriage. The discourse norms of romance, family, and 
 18 See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (analyzing the power of norms in the extra-legal 
regulation of conduct); see also Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1995) (critiquing norm-based regulation).  
 19 This example is drawn from Stephen Gillers’ discussion of the lawyer’s 
ethical obligation of candor to the tribunal in his excellent casebook. STEPHEN 
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 401-06 (8th ed., 
2009). Neither Gillers nor I intend to be characterizing Clinton’s actual statements to 
his wife in that most personal of conversations. Indeed, the statement “there is no 
sexual relationship” was really made not by Clinton, but in an affidavit by former 
Office of the President intern Monica Lewinsky, and later by Clinton’s lawyer, Wil-
liam Bennett, when characterizing Lewinsky’s affidavit. When Clinton said that “it 
depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is” he was responding to a question 
asking whether Bennett was lying when he said it. Id. at 404. Arguably, Clinton was 
trying to protect his lawyer as much as himself. In her memoir Hillary Clinton states 
that when reports of Bill’s affair broke in January of 1998, “I questioned Bill over and 
over . . . . [h]e continued to deny any improper behavior. . . .” HILLARY RODHAM 
CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 441 (2003). Later that year, she writes,  
[h]e told me for the first time that the situation was much more serious than 
he had previously acknowledged. He now realized that he would testify that 
there had been inappropriate intimacy. He told me that what had happened 
between them had been brief and sporadic. He couldn’t tell me seven 
months ago, he said, because he was too ashamed to admit it and he knew 
how angry and hurt I would be.  
Id. at 466. In his memoir, Clinton writes that when he acknowledged the affair to 
his wife, “I still didn’t understand why I had done something so wrong and stu-
pid; that understanding would come slowly, in the months of working on our 
relationship that lay ahead.” BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 800 (2004). 
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friendship generally occasion an expectation of co-operation with 
respect to the meaning of what is said. There is an assumption that the 
speech of the lover, the parent, the child, the friend, will be useful to 
the relationship of the interlocutors, and not solely to the individual 
speaking. These assumptions are a part of and lend meaning to the 
speech acts within such relationships.   
If, however, Bill spoke the words “there is no sexual relationship” 
in a different context, governed by different discourse norms, his 
words might have a very different import. For example, if he spoke 
them under cross-examination before a grand jury or a special-
prosecutor’s investigation, and if when he spoke them there had been 
no sexual encounter with the intern for several months, then the 
statement would probably not count as a lie. It would probably not 
even be considered “misleading” in a sense which would trigger con-
demnation or response. The accused’s relationship to the prosecutor is 
adversarial, and the discourse norms in such a relationship presume a 
less forthcoming, more self-interested mode of expression.20
2. Discourse Norms and Corporate Law 
 The 
point is that especially with respect to hard questions about the mean-
ing and significance of speech, the discourse norms are often decisive.  
a. Different Speech for Different Stakeholders 
Under prevailing law, different discourse norms attend corporate 
speech depending on the category of corporate stakeholder addressed.  
i. Shareholders 
The principal way that corporate law enforces the fiduciary duties 
that directors owe to shareholders is through the imposition of dis-
course norms. In order to satisfy their duty of care, directors must 
speak with each other about what kind of corporate conduct is in the 
shareholders’ best interest. Indeed, the requirement to speak and deli-
berate in an informed and good faith fashion more or less describes 
both the necessary and the sufficient condition for satisfying direc-
tors’ obligations to shareholders. Directors are completely insulated 
from liability to shareholders for bad, non-self-interested business 
decisions so long as they comply with the requirement of forthcom-
ing, honest, good faith deliberation in the shareholder interest. In or-
  
 20 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973) (“If a witness 
evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the wit-
ness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary exami-
nation.”). 
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der to satisfy that fiduciary duty of good faith, the director’s speech 
acts must also be sincere—she must honestly believe the things she 
says are in the shareholder’s best interest are in fact in their best inter-
est.21
ii. Non-shareholders 
 
Workers and consumers, like shareholders, are part of the nexus-
of-contracts over which the corporate board of directors presides.  
Instead of fiduciary-based attention at the level of firm governance, 
however, consumers must monitor their interests in corporate opera-
tions by themselves, in the market.  
Unlike shareholders, consumers are not as a matter of corporate 
law entitled to any internal corporate speech or deliberations about 
their interests. Corporations, however, are entitled under the First 
  
 21 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (quoted in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 
A.2d. 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009)). The court states: 
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or 
commentators who are not often required to face such questions, is that 
compliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judi-
cially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that 
leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or ratio-
nality of the process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering 
the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees 
of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational”, pro-
vides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that 
the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort 
to advance corporate interests. To employ a different rule—one that permit-
ted an “objective” evaluation of the decision—would expose directors to 
substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, 
in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests. Thus, the business judg-
ment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good 
faith board decisions. 
Id.; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) 
(“[T]he duty of care requires a director, when making a business decision, to proceed 
with a ‘critical eye’ by acting in an informed and deliberate manner respecting the 
corporate merits of an issue before the board.” (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
Fiduciary standards also govern corporate speech to their shareholders, whether such 
speech is voluntary or required under the federal securities laws. See Faith Stevelman 
Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s 
Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 524 (2000) (“[B]ecause 
shareholders’ best interests include being accurately informed about corporate affairs 
so that they are afforded a basis for their rational decisionmaking, managers’ fidu-
ciary duties must be understood to apply to the full panoply of official corporate 
disclosures routinely made by public corporations.”). 
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Amendment to speak to consumers through commercial advertising.22 
When corporations choose to speak to consumers, the discourse norms 
that accompany the speech are far less co-operative in nature than are 
the norms governing corporate discourse with its fiduciaries. Instead, 
the firm’s speech to its consumers reflects “the morals of the market-
place;” it is the kind of speech, in Cardozo’s words, “trodden by the 
crowd.”23
While corporations have a First Amendment right to advertise  
legal products, it is permissible for government to restrict false or mis-
leading commercial speech.
  
24
  
 22 In the 1970s, the Court extended First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech because it was convinced that commercial speech served the same or 
similar functions in a free society as does political speech—it helps to inform people 
about the existence, availability, and price of goods and services that might be useful 
to the well ordering of their lives. Nevertheless there are a few important distinctions 
in the First Amendment’s application to commercial speech. The Court has said that 
the First Amendment provides no protection to commercial speech that is false or 
misleading. This is distinct from the political speech context, wherein the Court has 
made clear that government cannot restrict or punish negligently false (or misleading) 
speech. The Court gives two justifications for these differences. First, the Court be-
lieves that commercial speakers have greater access to the truth or falsity of claims 
they may make about their goods or services than non-commercial speakers have 
about the truth or falsity of the political, social, theocratic, metaphysical, or moral 
claims they make. Second, the Court has stated that the profit motive behind corpo-
rate speech assuages the Court’s traditional concern that liability for false speech will 
over-deter the production and proliferation of socially useful speech. Thus, the gov-
ernment may forbid false or misleading commercial speech altogether. Where com-
mercial speech is not false or misleading, government may still regulate it provided 
the government is doing so to advance a substantial government interest and the 
speech regulation is no broader than necessary to vindicate the interest. However, the 
Court has definitively held that the government has no legitimate interest in keeping 
people from receiving truthful, non-misleading information about goods and services 
that are legal.  For example, government has no substantial interest, the Court has 
held, in limiting advertising for legal goods and services in order to reduce the con-
sumption of such things. Therefore, the Court almost never upholds restrictions on 
truthful, non-misleading speech. See David Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The 
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 507, 543-551 (2006) [hereinafter Resisting Deep Capture] (reviewing com-
mercial speech doctrine). 
 But the categories “false” and/or “mis-
leading” are of limited utility in analyzing contemporary corporate 
speech problems. A ubiquitous advertising campaign associating hap-
piness, health, and vitality with the consumption of junk food is not so 
much false or misleading in its failure to with similar zeal describe the 
 23 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928). 
 24 See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22. 
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health risks associated with frequent junk food consumption as it is, 
perhaps, incomplete and exploitative.25
We might describe the discourse norm of the marketplace as one 
in which “rhetoric,” in the sense of “insincere speech,”
  
26
The manipulative power of insincere speech is buttressed by the 
common law doctrine of “puffery,” which has been incorporated into 
modern consumer protection regimes such as the FTC and cognate 
state regulatory regimes. The puffery doctrine holds that facially ligh-
thearted boasting, whimsy, exaggeration, and “bluster” are, as a mat-
ter of law, not misleading, because reasonable people do not take such 
speech seriously. The problem is that human beings are in fact often 
influenced by discourse that the law calls “mere” puffery.
 is expected. 
That is, ordinary consumers generally know that rhetoric reigns in the 
market. But knowledge of its operation does not, unfortunately, rid 
rhetoric of its power and influence. Speech in such an idiom can much 
more easily manipulate consumers’ perception of the personal or so-
cial consequences of consumption than would fiduciary-based speech. 
Such consequences can be highly acute and personal, such as the de-
velopment of lung cancer or heart disease. Or, they may be farther-
reaching and more dispersed, such as the destruction of the environ-
ment. 
27 There are 
two lines of evidence for this. The first is social scientific inquiry, 
which has demonstrated in controlled experimental settings the influ-
ence of puffery.28
  
 25 See id. at 520-25 (examining the power of junk food advertising to mislead 
consumers with respect to the adverse health consequences associated with habitual 
consumption of such products); see also Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L. J. 1645, 1691-
1711 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales] (reviewing junk food marketing).  
 The second line of evidence is the market practice 
 26 Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for 
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 775 (2007). 
 27 I have previously argued that one practical, constitutionally permissible, 
and normatively estimable way of constraining the adverse influence of corporate 
advertising is to focus on the extent to which commercial speech is misleading, and 
develop a more psychologically informed conception of how human beings can be 
misled through manipulation of unseen cognitive and motivational biases and vulne-
rabilities. See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 542-83. But enforcement of 
any consumer protection standards by external government administration suffers 
from regulatory inefficiencies that are well documented. See The Public Choice Prob-
lem in Corporate Law, supra note 8. 
 28 See, e.g., Gregory S. Carpenter et al., Meaningful Brands from Meaning-
less Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. OF MARKETING 
RES. 339 (1994). Carpenter and his colleagues designed an experimental setting in 
which they asked subjects to rank their preferences for products said to have various 
attributes. The experiment deliberately included objectively meaningless bluster in its 
description of some product attributes. Id. at 342. For example, in one version of the 
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experiment, the researchers presented subjects with hypothetical down jackets, most 
of which were said to contain “regular down filling,” but one of which was said to 
contain “alpine class down fill.” The latter attribute was wholly meaningless (the 
researchers just made up the term and the attribute “alpine class down fill.”). Id. 
When asked to evaluate the products the subjects consistently ranked the “alpine class 
down fill” jackets as being superior to those described as having regular down fill, 
thus “demonstrating that buyers positively value the differentiated brand if the true 
value of the irrelevant attribute is not revealed to them.” Id. at 343.  
  The experimenters explained this outcome by reference to the fact that 
their subjects were engaged in a decision-making process characterized by limited 
cognitive resources and limited time. (This is true of all subjects, all consumers, and 
all humans—our brains and our time on Earth are finite, and thus our ability to take in 
and process information about the world around us is limited. See generally The Situ-
ational Character, supra note 16 (reviewing social science of human decision-making 
and its relevance for legal analysis)). Carpenter et al.’s subjects relied on a host of 
cognitive heuristics, short-cuts, and rules-of-thumb, to aid them in their decision-
making. These decision-making processes can be relatively easily manipulated, as 
Carpenter et al.’s study helps to demonstrate. For example, one heuristic that humans 
regularly employ, according to social scientists, is a general theory of communication 
which holds that “the purpose of communication is to inform, to communicate some-
thing not already known.” Carpenter et al., supra note 28, at 341 (citation omitted). 
Thus, consumers are cognitively biased towards believing that information communi-
cated to them will be meaningful. Id. Additionally, because our limited cognitive 
powers preclude us from assessing every element of circumstances in which we find 
ourselves, we tend to focus our evaluative efforts on those elements in a given envi-
ronment which are most highly salient. This cognitive tendency can be highly useful, 
as for example when walking through the woods we might ignore the pallid dynamics 
of the bugs or worms in our path and focus instead on the rather vivid Mountain Lion 
in front of us. Carpenter et al. argue that these dynamics were at work in their down 
jacket study: “[T]he irrelevant attribute makes the differentiated brand distinctive in 
consumers’ minds—not only different but more salient, perhaps perceptually domi-
nant, and therefore preferred.” Id. at 341 (citation omitted). 
  Our cognitive frailties thus leave us vulnerable to manipulation by discur-
sive methods that the law calls “mere” puffery. Unfortunately, the social science also 
suggests that the manipulative power of advertising irrelevant product attributes is not 
easily cured by simply pointing out the source of the manipulation. After their basic 
design, Carpenter et al. took their inquiry a step further. They revealed to their sub-
jects that the term “alpine class down fill” was meaningless, and that the down in 
jackets containing it was no different than regular down fill. Even after being in-
formed that the “alpine class down fill” bluster was meaningless, subjects persisted in 
evaluating the “alpine class down fill” jackets more favorably than the regular jackets. 
Id. at 341-43. “Subjects preferred the differentiated brand regardless of the informa-
tion revealed to them, suggesting that the primary impact of the irrelevant attribute 
was to increase the competitive salience of its brand.” Id. at 344. 
  Carpenter and his co-authors rightly conclude that findings such as these 
cast doubt on the conventional models of consumer behavior that inform many areas 
of law and social policy: 
Our results are somewhat disquieting for the model of rational choice. Cen-
tral to this view is the notion that preferences are fixed, exogenous, and  
revealed by choice. In this context, more information improves decision 
making—better informed consumers make better judgments. Irrelevant in-
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of profit-maximizing corporations which spend billions of dollars per 
year on advertising and promotional campaigns which often contain 
nothing but puffery.29 Where firms are operating in competitive mar-
kets, corporations that engage in puffery would be quickly subsumed 
by those who did not waste precious resources on such efforts, if it 
were as inconsequential as the law takes it to be.30
Corporate law scholars at times appear to believe that loose dis-
cursive standards for corporate speech directed at consumers is a  
necessary correlate to the command that firms pursue profits for 
shareholders. In a remarkable article on the problem of “half-truths” 
in corporate speech, Donald Langevoort argues that whether a “half-
truth” should give rise to a shareholder cause of action for securities 
fraud depends on to whom the “half-truth” was directed.
 
31
  
formation in such a framework is immaterial and should not affect deci-
sions. We show that irrelevant information does indeed have an impact. A 
brand attribute may not have objective value. Rather, preferences for it may 
be constructed in response to the context in which valuation is made. This 
suggests that, contrary to the model of rational choice, preferences are en-
dogenous, that is, constructed rather than revealed, and more information 
can bias decisions systematically. 
 If a firm 
tells a “half-truth” about the quality of its products, but directs the 
statement to consumers rather than shareholders, then shareholders 
should not have a cause of action. The reason for this, according to 
Langevoort, is that shareholders stand to gain from such half-truths 
being spoken to consumers, and therefore the shareholders should 
have no complaint about them. It is expected that directors will exag-
gerate the firm’s strengths when dealing with non-shareholders  
Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Findings such as these cast doubt in particular, I argue, 
on the shareholder primacy theory of corporate law, which presumes that the profit-
motive serves not just shareholder interests but also consumer interests, by forcing 
firms to discern consumer interests and serve them. If it is true, as the social science 
suggests, that corporations can often pursue profits for shareholders by manipulating 
or misleading consumers, rather than discerning and serving consumer desires, then 
we may have reason to doubt the social utility of shareholder primacy in firm gover-
nance. See also Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 525-38 (reviewing contra-
dictions between the law’s assumptions and social science’s conclusions about the 
power of puffery).  
 29 See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 521. 
 30 This may be overstated, for it may not be that puffery is not wholly mea-
ningless or that it has no effect, but merely that it does not mislead or confuse. Per-
haps puffery creates a sense of whimsy and excitement, and provides opportunity for 
identity formation and expression which is desirable and fun. So even if it is a little 
destructive in some ways, it is not unduly so, given its utility in other ways. In either 
event, it remains true that discourse norms in the marketplace are far less demanding 
than are the explicitly co-operative norms regulating corporate speech to sharehold-
ers. 
 31 Langevoort, supra note 17. 
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because this will make it easier for them to get better deals for share-
holders: “[C]ompany executives have a strong incentive to style gen-
eral corporate publicity to conform to a desirable image . . . that im-
age-making is said to be necessary to capture desired resources for the 
firm from among a broad array of constituents, both internal and ex-
ternal.”32 And therefore, “[e]xpressions of optimism should not be 
actionable in those settings where hype is most commonplace: the 
kinds of statements made with customer and employee audiences 
largely in mind.”33
b. Pushing Past the Pareto Fallacy of Corporate Profitability  
 If I understand Langevoort correctly, his point is 
that “half-truths” should not be actionable precisely because they can 
influence non-shareholders in a manner beneficial to shareholders. It 
thus appears that what is part of the solution for shareholders is part of 
the problem for non-shareholders.  
Conversations about corporate governance and the relationship 
between various stakeholders in corporate enterprise sometimes dege-
nerate into what I call “the Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability.”34 
The fallacy is the view that, in the end, boards of directors will always 
maximize profits for shareholders if they make decisions that are also 
in the best interest of workers, consumers, and the community at-
large. The fallacy assumes that worker-friendly decisions will attract 
and retain the best workers, and consumer friendly decisions will at-
tract and retain the most loyal consumers, thereby ensuring maximum 
returns to shareholders. Under this view, there is no conflict between 
shareholder interests and stakeholder interests, so long as corporate 
boards sufficiently seize the synergies available to them.35
  
 32 Id. at 107. 
  
 33 Id. at 122. 
 34 Economists usefully distinguish between two kinds of efficiency. The first 
and best kind is called “Pareto” efficiency. A Pareto efficient rule or proposed altera-
tion to a rule is one which makes at least one person better-off, and which makes 
nobody worse off. Pareto efficiency is so comely a thing that it probably deserves a 
better name. A second kind of efficiency, also good but not great, is “Kaldor-Hicks” 
efficiency, which refers to a rule or proposal which would improve the lot of one 
person more than it would harm the lot of another, but it makes no promises as to 
distributional consequences. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is only potentially beautiful. It 
requires either some justification for the distributional burdens occasioned by its 
operation, or else it requires some additional rule or program to ensure that the effi-
ciency gains realized from the rule are somehow transferred to compensate the parties 
harmed on the way to increasing the overall social pie. See RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-17 (7th ed. 2007).  
 35 Such assumptions about the reconcilability of corporate social responsi-
bility and profitability were already widespread enough for E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to 
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To be sure, there is plenty of evidence that some corporations 
sometimes can do best for their shareholders by doing good for all 
corporate stakeholders.36
  
reference, and critique them, in his famous 1932 essay, For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees: 
 There are some investment funds which in-
No doubt it is to a large extent true that an attempt by business managers to 
take into consideration the welfare of employees and consumers . . . will in 
the long run increase the profits of stockholders. As Dean Donham and oth-
ers have demonstrated, it is the lack of a feeling of security on the part of 
those who are dependent on employment for their livelihood which is large-
ly responsible for the present under-consumption which has so disastrous an 
effect upon business profits. . . . And yet one need not be unduly credulous 
to feel that there is more to this talk of social responsibility on the part of 
corporation managers than merely a more intelligent appreciation of what 
tends to the ultimate benefit of their stockholders.  
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156-1157. The reconcilability of responsibility and profits 
continues to be a theme in contemporary scholarship and public policy debate. See, 
e.g., STEVEN ROCHLIN ET AL., STATE OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S.: A VIEW 
FROM INSIDE 2003-2004 4 (2004) (“[B]usiness executives see corporate citizenship as 
a fundamental part of business. . . . 82 percent of executives surveyed say that good 
corporate citizenship helps the bottom line.”), available at 
http://bclc.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/files/04stateccreport.pdf; Cherie Metcalf, 
Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law: Third Party Rankings as 
Regulation by Information, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 145, 158-59 (2010) (“[C]orporate 
social responsibility may enhance profitability through increased employee productiv-
ity or reduced labor costs. . . . The adoption of corporate social responsibility com-
mitments can serve as a way to screen employees and allow firms to pay reduced 
wages or gain loyalty and productivity thereby enhancing profitability.”); Robert 
Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards for Sustainable Corporate 
Governance, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 47, 77 (2010) (“[Scholars have] found that 
‘consumers are willing to pay substantially more for ethically produced goods, sug-
gesting that there is a financial reward for socially responsible behavior.’”) (citation 
omitted); Reena De Asis, Corporate Giving and the Social Economy, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 13, 2011, 12:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reena-de-
asis/corporate-giving-and-the-_b_833626.html (“Corporate giving can be strategic 
while also being a valuable investment in the community. One major strategic benefit 
is an increase in brand awareness that can result in a competitive edge.”). 
 36 The urtext of this fallacy is the example of Johnson & Johnson Inc.’s reac-
tion to the cyanide-in-the-Tylenol scandal of 1982. After a still-unknown malefactor 
laced several bottles of Tylenol in the Chicago area with cyanide, the company was 
quickly and fully forthcoming about the risk, pulled all of its products off store 
shelves at substantial short-term cost to the company, and came back to the market 
with substantially improved safety mechanisms. Such forthright conduct was widely 
credited with helping the firm to quickly regain its market share after the crisis. See 
Lisa Hope Nicholson, Culture is the Key to Employee Adherence to Corporate Codes 
of Ethics, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 449, 453 n.27 (2008). Johnson & Johnson had made 
good on its much ballyhooed credo of putting the health of its customers first among 
its corporate priorities. This credo, which was crafted by company founders before the 
firm went public in 1943, explicitly puts the interest of consumers ahead of those of 
shareholders: “We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and pa-
tients, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In 
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vest only in firms that are “socially responsible.” Some of these funds 
have outperformed investment funds without “social responsibility” 
restrictions or purposes.37 It is not at all surprising that corporate op-
erations that actually serve the interests of all stakeholders would be 
among the best performing firms in the market. But this success in no 
way casts doubt on the fact that there are other profit opportunities 
that are available in more exploitative arrangements that lie beyond 
the parameters of the social responsibility investment funds, but well 
within the parameters of the law. There is plenty of evidence that 
there are times when the profitable thing is for a corporation to act 
sharp with one of its stakeholders. Just because the forty dollars lying 
on the ground at the top of the sunny hill will be seen and gathered 
does not mean that the twenty dollars buried under the ground in the 
dark valley will be left alone.38
  
meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must constantly 
strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices.” Our Credo, 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., 
http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563df9e22be1bb31559c7/our-
credo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Only after reviewing the firm’s obligations to other 
stakeholders, including “employees” and “communities,” does the credo in its con-
cluding paragraph state, “Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business 
must make a sound profit. . . . When we operate according to these principles [of the 
credo], the stockholders should realize a fair return.” Id.  
 
  Nevertheless, the cyanide-in-the-Tylenol case notwithstanding, there is 
plenty of other evidence that manipulation and exploitation has also been an impor-
tant part of the firm’s overall pursuit of profits. For example, Johnson & Johnson 
recently agreed to an $81 million settlement with the federal government in connec-
tion with alleged civil and criminal violations of statutory prohibitions against the 
marketing of prescription drugs for treatments not approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration. This off-label marketing practice was purportedly undertaken through 
corporate subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson, Inc. The firms allegedly marketed drugs 
that were approved only for the treatment of epilepsy as also useful in the treatment of 
obesity, a use which may have put patients at risk for serious health problems. See 
Press Release, Department of Justice, Two Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay 
Over $81 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Topomax (Apr. 
29, 2010) available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-500.html. 
 37 See Olaf Weber, Marco Mansfeld, & Eric Schirrmann, The Financial 
Performance of SRI Funds Between 2002 and 2009 (June 25, 2010) (unpublished) (on 
file with HEALTH MATRIX), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630502. Then again, “sin stock” 
funds—comprised of firms trading in alcohol, tobacco, weapons, and pornography—
also have outperformed the S&P 500. See Charles Sizemore, Why Good Investors 
Like “Bad” Stocks, MINYAVILLE MEDIA, INC. (Aug. 31, 2010, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.minyanville.com/investing/articles/sin-stock-vice-fund-playboy-
stock/8/31/2010/id/29891. 
 38 See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Expla-
nation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 141, 186 n.156 (1997):  
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It is therefore important to emphasize that the problems that cor-
porate law presents for non-shareholders cannot be remedied by hop-
ing for better corporate governance within the shareholder primacy 
paradigm. The Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability debilitates 
honest discussion and communication about hard choices that need to 
be made in social policy. 
In its most complete articulation, shareholder primacy theory is 
not committed to the claim that shareholder primacy in firm gover-
nance will always serve all stakeholder interests. Instead, the domi-
nant view is dependent upon the idea that government regulation can 
protect non-shareholders from corporate misconduct where contract 
proves an inadequate mechanism to protect non-shareholders from the 
exploitative power of the shareholder primacy firm.39 The trouble is 
that shareholder primacy itself compels firms to work within the polit-
ical realm to undermine the development of such profit-stifling regu-
lations. In other work I have analyzed the broad public choice dynam-
ics which inhibit the proper functioning of the political systems on 
which shareholder primacy theory relies for its coherence.40
  
[A]ccording to a famous, but perhaps apocryphal, story, a University of 
Chicago economist and a student were walking together. The student saw 
$20 on the floor, and pointed it out to the economist, remarking ‘Look! 
There’s $20 on the floor. Aren’t you going to pick it up?’ The economist’s 
response, purportedly, was to say ‘Naah; there can’t be a $20 bill on the 
floor. Somebody would have picked it up,’ and continue walking, without 
even glancing down. 
 Here I am 
concerned with analyzing in particular the irreconcilability of the dis-
course norms that govern corporate political speech, on the one hand, 
  Lisa Fairfax argues that corporations in the last ten years have engaged in 
historically unprecedented levels of “rhetoric” regarding corporate social responsibili-
ty. The impressive empirical investigation she undertook seems largely to show that 
there is little connection between such rhetoric and socially responsible corporate 
conduct. Fairfax, supra note 26, at 789-92. Fairfax states: 
62% of Fortune 100 companies are not included in the Domini 400 Social 
Index . . . only seventeen companies in the Fortune 100 appear on the list of 
the top 100 Best Corporate Citizens, a list which comprises the public com-
panies that best serve stakeholders, including stockholders, employees, cus-
tomers, the community, and the environment. . . . The fact that only 17% of 
Fortune 100 companies appear on this list while 98% of such companies 
embrace rhetoric suggesting a responsibility towards stakeholders reflects a 
seeming divergence between corporate rhetoric and reality.  
Id.  
 39 See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8. 
 40 Because of their size, narrow interests, technical skills, and wealth, corpo-
rations enjoy collective action advantages over workers and consumers in the compe-
tition for regulatory favor. Thus, corporations can regularly stymie the development 
of external regulations on which shareholder primacy theory relies for its coherence. 
See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8. 
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and those that are expected in the arena of political speech, on the 
other.  
c. Corporate Political Speech and the Norm of Public Reason 
Modern liberal political theory considers speech to be an essential 
element of legitimacy in social organization.41 Political theorists argue 
that people have a fundamental moral obligation to speak with each 
other about proposed solutions to hard and contested problems.42 
Speaking with each other provides us a non-violent, orderly, reasona-
ble way of getting along with each other even though we may strongly 
disagree about important matters.43
It is not just any speech, but rather a particular kind of restrained 
speech which is needed if society is to successfully evade the destruc-
tive threat of other forms of dispute resolution, such as fighting. The 
liberal political tradition has developed a discourse norm of “public 
reason” which purports to fit the bill. The norm of public reason dif-
fers from the discourse norms evident in family, fiduciary, contrac-
tual, or legal-adversarial relationships. The purpose of the norm of 
public reason is “to identify normative premises all political partici-
pants find reasonable (or at least, not unreasonable).”
 
44
  
 41 See Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 6 (1989).  
 The norm of 
 42 Ackerman calls this obligation to speak “the supreme pragmatic impera-
tive.” Id. at 10. 
 43 See id. at 9. An economically oriented theorist might argue that a far better 
way through which social arrangements receive legitimacy is through voluntary ex-
change in free markets. Prices—more particularly, the willingness to pay a price and 
the willingness to accept payment in exchange for a certain outcome—provides a far 
better basis of legitimacy than the minutes of any meeting ever could. But this kind of 
market legitimacy is only fully reliable when the distributional status-quo is legiti-
mate. See id. at 10-11 (“Of course, once I agree that those bricks over there are 
rightfully called ‘yours,’ and you agree that this beer over here is rightfully ‘mine,’ 
we may then side-step our [other] moral disagreements by trading away to our hearts’ 
content.”). In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman argues that the legitimacy 
problems of the distributional status quo can only be shown with reference to the 
adverse consequences of altering them. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 161-77 (1982). Friedman emphasizes the power of the “payment in accor-
dance with product” principle in facilitating voluntary, private coordination of enter-
prise. Id. at 162. According to Friedman, radical redistribution of wealth, even inter-
generationally, would rob society of the utility of the “payment in accordance with 
product” principle. Of course, it does not seem that Friedman’s principle would be 
upended if wealth accumulated through violence, exploitation, or sham was redistri-
buted. Id. Whatever one thinks of Friedman’s argument, notice that it is perfectly in 
keeping with Ackerman’s primary injunction to explain in words why we should go 
along with a social design. Friedman’s essay is an exercise in legitimation, and a 
vindication of the view that only speech can give full legitimacy to market exchange.  
 44 Ackerman, supra note 41, at 17. 
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public reason thus requires individuals to discuss and resolve conflicts 
in a manner which does not require either party to “lose” in the deep 
sense of being put in a position where they have to renounce their 
particular moral commitments in favor of their opponent’s. To comply 
with the norm of public reason, speakers must therefore justify their 
public policy preferences in a manner that does not appeal to any dis-
tinct world-view. Instead of appealing to the authority of a totalizing 
(religious or secular) conception of the meaning and purpose of life, 
the norm of public reason enjoins us to articulate and defend our pub-
lic policy positions with reference only to social values that are com-
mon to all world-views.  
But this is not mere acting. An important element in the discourse 
norm of public reason is that political interlocutors must be (justifia-
bly) disposed to believe each other’s speech. The norm of public rea-
son thus requires speakers to believe in good faith that their preferred 
public policy advances an overlapping conception of a socially desir-
able outcome. To conform to the norm of public reason, you must 
really believe what you say, and not secretly prefer a policy simply 
because it advances one’s privately valued world view. The discourse 
norm of public reason therefore requires sincerity.45
One big problem with the norm of public reason, as Dan Kahan 
argues, is that as a cognitive matter we humans cannot really pull it 
off.
  
46 Social psychologists have demonstrated that most people quite 
easily, and sincerely, believe that they themselves routinely conform 
their public-oriented thoughts and expression to the requirements of 
public reason, but they are doubtful that other people do the same. 
Social psychologists tell us that in these assessments we are usually 
right about other people and wrong about ourselves. Human thinking 
and decision-making is profoundly influenced by cognitive biases and 
self-serving motivations.47
  
 45 It is important to emphasize that I am concerned here with exploring the 
contradictions between the kind of speech prescribed by canonical accounts of corpo-
rate theory, on the one hand, and liberal political theory on the other. I am not  
attempting to characterize extant patterns of political speech. Nevertheless, other 
scholars have made the claim that participants in mainstream political discourse do 
endeavor to conform to the norm of public reason. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The 
Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 118 (2007). 
 While people genuinely believe that they 
analyze public policy problems “objectively,” we in fact tend to assess 
 46 See id.  
 47 See id. at 129-131; see also The Situational Character, supra note 16, at 
90-120 (reviewing social psychological studies regarding both the ubiquity of moti-
vated reasoning in human thinking and the tendency of people to be blind to the influ-
ence of such motivations on their own thinking even as they readily diagnose moti-
vated reasoning in others). 
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policy debates through the biased frameworks of our own personal 
“world-views” (i.e., our private “preferences about how society 
should be organized.”).48 We accurately diagnose this dynamic in our 
interlocutors, even as we are blind to it in ourselves. The term that 
social psychologists have settled on for this ironic epistemological 
dynamic is “naïve realism”—we are naïve about ourselves, realistic 
about others. We thus tend to view our interlocutors, especially those 
whose world views we do not share, as only pretending to conform to 
the norm of public reason. And they think the same of us.49
Kahan argues that since we are cognitively incapable of truly con-
forming to the norm of public reason, even people’s good-faith efforts 
to conform to it are likely only to antagonize their opponents, who 
must now contend not only with an adversary whose world view they 
oppose, but an adversary who is lying about the relationship between 
  
  
 48 See Kahan, supra note 45, 122. Drawing on psychological and anthropo-
logical research, Kahan identifies four basic world-view types which subconsciously 
inform people’s thinking about public policy problems: “communitarians” who “favor 
a . . . social order in which the needs and interests of individuals are subordinated to 
the collective”; “individualists” who desire a “society . . . in which individuals are 
responsible for securing their own well-being without collective assistance or interfe-
rence”; “hierarchalists” who support a social order “in which . . . opportunities . . . 
and obligations are distributed on the basis of largely fixed social attributes, such as 
gender, ethnicity, lineage, and class”; and “egalitarians” who favor a society in which 
such fixed attributes “play no role in the . . . distribution of . . . opportunities . . . [and] 
obligations.” Id. at 122-23. The accuracy of this particular categorization scheme is 
less important for present purposes than is the general claim that our “world-views” 
subconsciously influence our public policy assessments even as we view ourselves as 
thinking through such problems an objective, unbiased fashion.  
 49 Consider the public-health related example of tobacco regulation. Propo-
nents of smoking regulations endeavor to conform to the norm of public reason and 
“invoke secular rationales: reducing the public health costs of treating lung cancer 
victims, and abating the risk of disease or the simple annoyance associated with in-
gesting ‘second-hand smoke.’” Id. at 136 (citations omitted). Smokers and other 
opponents of tobacco regulation are suspicious of these justifications and “detect the 
unmistakable signature of animus toward the cultural values that smoking expresses.” 
Id. at 137. Opponents of smoking regulation, meanwhile, also publicly conform their 
arguments to the norm of public reason, pointing to studies which show that smoking 
actually reduces public health care expenditures (because smokers die much younger 
than non-smokers), or by arguing that because drinking and driving causes far more 
harm than does second-hand smoke, public health advocates should turn their atten-
tion to restricting drinking in bars rather than forbidding smoking in bars. Id. at 138-
39. Advocates of tobacco regulation look past such secular arguments and see instead 
opponents motivated by “a constellation of negative values, such as weakness, crude-
ness, and irrationality, along with a culpable heedlessness of social obligation.” Id. at 
137. 
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their world view and the polices they support. This antagonizes social 
strife.50
If we analyze the norm of public reason in connection with corpo-
rate social and political speech this problem is particularly evident.
 
51 
Firms endeavor to comply with the norm of public reason in their  
political speech.52
  
 50 But see Ackerman, supra note 41, at 20-21. Ackerman argues that the 
norm of public reason is not all that difficult for humans, as is evidenced by our con-
tinual compliance with the myriad discourse norms that govern different aspects of 
our lives:  
 But they do not succeed. We know that there are 
profound institutional biases and motivations behind the speech; in 
particular biases and motivations favoring the narrow interests of di-
rectors and shareholders, rather than the public good generally. Cor-
porate speakers may believe in good faith that they fully conform to 
the norm of public reason. After all, corporate lobbyists are not corpo-
rate law scholars or psychologists. They are fully immersed within the 
norm of public reason and the Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability, 
To be a competent social actor, I must constantly engage in a process of se-
lective repression—restraining the impulse to speak the truth on a vast 
number of role-irrelevant matters so as to get on with the particular form of 
life in which I am presently engaged. . . . Rather than assault the very idea 
of role playing, it seems wiser to seek relief in the marvelous human capaci-
ty to shift role engagements over time. I can be a lawyer, teacher, construc-
tion worker, father, baseball coach—as well as a liberal citizen. 
Id. The difference between Ackerman and Kahan is the difference between intuition 
and social science. Ackerman’s common sense leaves him confident in our capacities 
for objectivity; Kahan relies on experimental evidence demonstrating that in impor-
tant ways that confidence is misplaced.  
 51 As with advertising, corporations are as a matter of constitutional law 
entitled to engage in this political speech. See The Public Choice Problem in Corpo-
rate Law, supra note 8. 
 52 For example, junk food corporations have spent millions of dollars to fund 
a substantial amount of political speech organized through issue advocacy groups, 
political advertising, and local, state, and federal lobbying efforts. See generally 
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION, 
AND HEALTH (Darra Goldstein ed., 2002) (reviewing food industry efforts to influence 
food regulation); MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT (2006) (reviewing food in-
dustry influence on political process). In these arenas the industry has not argued 
against restrictions on the sale and advertising of junk food on the grounds that such 
regulations would diminish profits and would be bad for their shareholders. Instead, 
the industry has in its political speech adopted a public interest idiom that has focused 
on the idea that restrictions on junk food regulations should not be adopted because 
they would undermine individual responsibility and diminish consumer choice. See 
Broken Scales, supra note 25, at 1769-1802. Among other accomplishments, these 
efforts have resulted in the adoption of laws forbidding lawsuits against food corpora-
tions for obesity-related harms in at least twenty-three states. David Burnett, Fast-
Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing Congress’s Response to the 
Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 365 (2007). 
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contentedly telling their political interlocutors that corporate profita-
bility makes all stakeholders better off.53
The incompatibility between the norm of public reason and the 
dynamics of corporate speech has two iniquitous effects. The first is 
that while corporations often succeed in achieving the policies they 
promote, such policies are not reliably in the public interest, but are 
instead reflective of corporate bias and motivation, which is share-
holder primacy. The second consequence is that, for reasons Kahan 
makes clear, the public and policymakers are largely suspicious and 
resentful of corporate political speech. It may be that the “merely” 
sincere adherence to the norm of public reason by firms operating in 
the political realm is what helps give rise to the abiding skepticism 
and animosity that Americans have towards corporations.
 So the agents of corporate 
social and political speech may believe they have conformed to the 
norm of public reason just as sincerely as do regular people. But they 
are no more successful at it. 
54 The juxta-
position of professed objectivity or public spirit with the bias that we 
otherwise know they have is particularly galling. One survey from 
2002 found that 70 percent of Americans “did not trust what . . . cor-
porations told them and 60 percent called corporate wrongdoing ‘a 
widespread problem.’”55
The discourse norms that animate corporate speech inevitably 
clash with the norm of public reason, deepening our cynicism about 
the legitimacy of both corporations and government. Corporate politi-
cal speech advances the firm’s mission of corporate profitability, but 
it inhibits the mission of political speech in a free society. In particu-
lar, it precludes the full development of consumer, worker, and envi-
  
  
 53 See, e.g., Steven Brill, On Sale: Your Government. Why Lobbying is 
Washington’s Best Bargain, TIME, July 12, 2010, at 28. Brill quotes Dave Wenhold, 
President of the American League of Lobbyists:  
If you banned all lobbying tomorrow, the legislative process would grind to 
a halt. You can call us special interests, but the ones who are especially in-
terested are the ones who can explain the consequences of writing a bill this 
way or that way. We make the system work.  
Id. at 28. Another trade-association executive interviewed by Brill argued:  
Most members [of Congress] may know one or two issues well, if that. 
Then you have a 26-year old kid, maybe he’s [sic] even 30 and went to a 
good law school, who’s on the staff working 10 hours a day and is sup-
posed to tell his [sic] boss how to do derivatives regulation or credit-card 
reform. Are you kidding? 
Id. at 32.  
 54 Many studies describe a widespread “distrust” of corporations. See, e.g., 
Fairfax, supra note 26, at 787. 
 55 JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 152 (2003). 
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ronmental protection regimes that are needed before shareholder pri-
macy in corporate governance can be sanctified.56
II. REFORMING CORPORATE LAW THROUGH 
PRESCRIPTIVE DISCOURSE NORMS 
  
I assert that the discourse norms attending corporations’ relation-
ships with their various stakeholders are themselves part of the default 
terms that comprise corporate law’s enabling regime. The discourse 
norms provide rules of construction for the express speech (or silence) 
of the corporation to or about its stakeholders. Like corporate law 
itself, these norms are neither necessary nor inevitable—they are pre-
scribed as part of a social construction project enabled by positive 
law. The default discourse norms that we find in corporate law get 
their justification from shareholder primacy theory, which I have ar-
gued is wanting. Corporate law might thus consider an alteration in 
the discourse norms that govern the firm’s relationship with different 
stakeholders.  
A. The Utility of Multi-Fiduciary Discourse  
 Progressive corporate law scholars have suggested that an alter-
native to shareholder primacy might be a corporate governance  
regime that requires directors to actively attend to the interests of mul-
tiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance.57
Fiduciary discourse is not an end in itself; it is a mechanism 
through which “trust” can be developed and managed. Trust is valua-
 In a multi-
stakeholder regime directors would be charged with attending to the 
interests of all of the firm’s stakeholders with care and loyalty. Such a 
regime could be enforced the same way that fiduciary obligations are 
presently enforced by corporate law: by imposing discourse obliga-
tions on directors. Under a multi-stakeholder regime directors would 
be required to become informed about and discuss—in the honest, 
complete, good-faith fashion of fiduciary discourse—the impact of 
corporate plans on multiple stakeholders’ interests. Under a multi-
fiduciary regime, workers and consumers would be entitled to such 
corporate speech, just as shareholders are entitled to it now. In this 
section, I examine the possibility of using prescriptive discourse 
norms as a means of institutionalizing multiple-stakeholder corporate 
governance.  
  
 56 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.  
 57 See The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, supra note 4 at 295-311 
(examining the possibility of multi-stakeholder corporate governance).  
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ble in the corporate context because it can serve as a highly efficient 
solution to the “agency problem” that corporate stakeholders face 
when turning control of firm resources over to the board of direc-
tors.58 While we may reserve the highest forms of trust for our most 
intimate associations, it is very clear that trust does not require “thick” 
relationships.59 Trust is an important component in our personal, pro-
fessional, and consumer lives.60 To greater or lesser degrees, we may 
trust that individuals within an organization or institution will “take 
our interests into account when determining what course of action to 
pursue.”61
Before corporate stakeholders can trust a firm’s board of direc-
tors, however, the board must behave in a trustworthy fashion. The 
difficulty of obtaining trustworthy conduct by boards is, again, the 
fundamental problem that corporate law scholars have traditionally 
assessed from the shareholder perspective. An important part of the 
solution that corporate law uses to engender this fidelity involves the 
imposition of discourse norms on board operations. That is, one of the 
ways that corporate law gets directors to behave in a trustworthy fa-
shion is by requiring directors to engage in speech acts expressing and 
analyzing the interests they are charged with pursuing.
  
62 This mechan-
ism can also be deployed to deepen directors’ ties to multiple stake-
holders. The active expression of commitment introduces a crucial 
psychological dynamic. Human beings are deeply motivated to see 
themselves, and to be seen by others, as consistent and coherent 
across different behavioral and decision-making contexts.63 Expres-
sions of commitment can thus lay the tracks for future conduct that 
will be consistent with the commitment, as we are loath to view our-
selves as hypocritical or contradictory.64
  
 58 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
 Social psychologists have 
 59 Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corpo-
rate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 152 
(2009). 
 60 “Trust” is an important component to relationships that lie between being, 
on the one hand “determinate,” as where incentives and enforcement are very strong 
and aligned, and those on the other hand that are fully “indeterminate,” as when we 
have no reason to expect a particular course of behavior. RUSSEL HARDIN, TRUST AND 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 12 (2002); see also Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cogni-
tive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2006).  
 61 Siebecker, supra note 59, at 146. 
 62 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 63 See The Situational Character, supra note 16, at 91-100, 107-14. 
 64 Fairfax, supra note 26, at 776. There is evidence that putting one’s com-
mitments in writing, and signing them, has a particularly powerful impact in terms of 
internalization and identifying with a commitment, perhaps also with the group with 
whom one is signing the oath or statement. Id. 
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shown that articulating a particular perspective can change the under-
lying attitude of the person speaking even where the speech act is in 
the first instance prescribed by a “role” rather than the private, subjec-
tive feelings or thoughts.65 This relationship between speech, com-
mitment, and behavior happens automatically in our subconscious 
cognitive processing.66
In addition to being motivated to view ourselves as consistent and 
coherent, we human beings are also motivated to be viewed positively 
by the groups with which we associate ourselves.
 
67 Corporate law also 
harnesses this fundamental psychological drive to help spur trustwor-
thy behavior by corporate directors. A corporate board is a collegial 
body that can induce the desire for group affirmation in the hearts and 
minds of its members. Again, the director’s obligation to speak her 
commitments stokes this powerful commitment mechanism. When a 
director promises to attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders 
before a group of other directors, who are making the same promise, 
she will tend to keep her commitment more consistently than if she 
just says it to herself, or thinks it to herself. The director knows that 
others will be watching and will hold her accountable if she malingers 
or cheats—by shunning her, refusing to support her reappointment the 
board, or refusing to invite her to serve on other corporate or civic 
boards with which they are associated. Professor Bainbridge considers 
this power of the “reputational” community to be an important reason 
why corporate law requires firms to be managed by a “board” and not 
by the fiat of a single individual.68 Bainbridge wants this power to be 
deployed in advance of shareholder primacy,69
Another important member of the corporate reputational commu-
nity is the Delaware Court of Chancery. A number of scholars have 
emphasized the role that the Chancery Court plays in exposing, con-
demning, and shaming directorial misconduct, even where the court 
restrains itself from imposing actual liability or damages for the mis-
 but it can also help 
enable a loyal, capable multi-stakeholder corporate governance re-
gime.  
  
 65 Id. at 777; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Intro-
duction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep 
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 169 (2003). 
 66 See Fairfax, supra note 26, at 801; see generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra 
note 65 (emphasizing important part played by unseen cognitive and motivational 
processes on conscious thinking and action). 
 67 See The Situational Character, supra note 16, at 100-15.  
 68 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 100-05. 
 69 See id. at 104. 
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conduct it identifies.70
The canonical account of corporate law is already committed to 
the view that reputational dynamics can serve an important part in 
bonding corporate directors to their principals. In fact, in the canonical 
account the competence of board members to police each other and 
keep each other true (enough) to the corporate mission serves as a 
crucial justification for corporate law’s embrace of near total direc-
torial discretion over the corporation’s affairs, even to the extent that 
it allows directors to stymie the market for corporate control with 
structural defenses (e.g., “poison pills,” etc.) that essentially allow the 
board to “just say no” to hostile takeovers.
 The world of corporate directors is a fairly 
small one. In it, reputation and honor often matter more than pecu-
niary rewards, which most directors of large publicly traded corpora-
tions already have before joining the world of corporate directorships. 
In this culture what Delaware judges say matters as much or more 
than what judges do. Formally expanding the fiduciary relationship to 
multiple stakeholders would provide judges the occasion to celebrate 
or condemn corporate conduct as it relates to workers, consumers and 
other stakeholders, even where the Chancery Court is reluctant to 
formally find directors liable for damages in connection with unwor-
thy conduct.  
71
Of course, people’s ability to fulfill commitments degenerates 
when multiple commitments present conflicts. Lisa Fairfax argues that 
corporations actively concerned with multiple stakeholders may need 
to resolve this problem by limiting the number of groups to which 
they make commitments, or else to be clear about their hierarchy of 
commitments.
 The acid bath of the mar-
ket is kept lidded, while corporate law puts its faith in the fidelity of 
the board. This faith and this power, driven by speech acts operating 
under fiduciary discourse norms, can be put to use in service of a 
broader set of directorial commitments. 
72
  
 70 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Cor-
porate Law Work, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013-1016 (1997) (arguing that “Delaware 
opinions can be understood as providing a set of parables—instructive tales—of good 
managers and bad managers”; these tales then “provide a supplemental source of 
gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors [i.e., directors and officers]”); see 
also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, 
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. STATE L. REV. 847 (2009) (extending Rock’s thesis 
with special reference to the role of the business press).  
 Yet to respond to this conundrum as Fairfax suggests 
 71 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 134-53.  
 72 Fairfax, supra note 26, at 816 n.223 (“Indeed, the consistency principle 
suggests that the multiplicity problem may undermine achievement of all the goals 
encompassed by the stakeholder rhetoric, including goals associated with shareholder 
concerns.”). This is precisely the problem, and the reason why behavioral insights 
about trust discourse must not be used to try to deepen shareholder primacy.  
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would leave us again with shareholder primacy in firm governance, an 
approach which leaves non-shareholding stakeholders vulnerable to 
corporate overreaching.  
The inevitable conflict involved in multiple commitments has 
been one of the main arguments that advocates of shareholder primacy 
have used to reject the plausibility of multi-stakeholder corporate go-
vernance. This is sometimes referred to as the “two masters” problem: 
“[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, 
a little for the community) has been freed from both and is answerable 
to neither.”73 But the “two masters” argument proves too much. Under 
the prevailing shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance, 
directors are already charged with managing conflicts between many 
different masters. For example, shareholders with a large portion of 
their wealth invested in one firm would prefer the firm to adopt a risk-
averse business strategy, but diversified shareholders would prefer 
their firms to be more risk-preferring. Older, infirm, or impatient 
shareholders want short-term profits, while younger, healthier or more 
patient shareholders want to wait on steady growth. Preferred stock-
holders prefer certain-short term gains but common stockholders pre-
fer riskier long-term strategies. Some shareholders want profits with-
out regard to ethical consequences, other investors are willing to ease 
up on the profit throttle if it means doing less harm to others. Propo-
nents of shareholder primacy in firm governance have not considered 
the inevitable conflicts in simultaneous commitments to these differ-
ent groups of shareholders to be an insurmountable problem. Instead, 
the inevitability of conflicts between different groups of shareholders 
is advanced as one of the key reasons why corporations must be run 
by an independent, authoritative board of directors which can manage 
such conflicts in a way that best serves the interests of all competing 
parties.74
  
 73 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). The “two masters” formulation is an allusion to the Gos-
pel of Matthew. Matthew 6:24 (Revised Standard Version) (“No one can serve two 
masters; for either he will either hate the one and love the other, he will or be devoted 
to one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.”). 
 Directors presently do this with almost no guidance from 
courts or statutory law as to whose interests are to be privileged in 
what circumstances when conflicts inevitably arise. The confidence 
that corporate law already evinces in directors’ ability to overcome the 
two-masters problem across different groups of shareholders should 
also serve to assuage doubts that directors can effectively manage 
conflicts across different groups of stakeholders.  
 74 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 45-50, 60-65. 
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Nevertheless, the reality of conflicts between different stakehold-
ers should be reflected in the discursive practices of multi-stakeholder 
corporate governance. Directorial speech about stakeholders need not 
always be concerned with maximizing trust. Indeed, once trust has 
been established in a relationship, our motive for coherence and the 
threat of dissonance sometimes keeps us trusting too much, which can 
leave us vulnerable to manipulation.75 We tend in our explanations of 
our behavior (to ourselves and others) to minimize the inconsistency 
in competing obligations in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance 
we would otherwise suffer.76 As Claire Hill and Erin Ann O’Hara 
recently pointed out, social policy should be concerned not with 
“maximizing” trust, but with optimizing it.77
B. Prescriptive Discourse Norms 
 The discursive goal of 
corporate speech must then be clarity and honesty, rather than neces-
sarily trust-inducing in every case. Directors should be encouraged to 
recognize conflicts between stakeholders and to communicate openly 
and honestly about them. 
Corporate law scholarship must help boards of directors to devel-
op effective ways of engaging in multi-stakeholder discourse. In this 
section I briefly examine two different “prescriptive” discourse norms 
authored by two leading scholars for use in other areas, but which I 
think might usefully be deployed to help develop a new default dis-
course norm for use in multi-stakeholder corporate governance.  
1. Expressive Overdetermination in Firm Governance 
Earlier, I reviewed Dan Kahan’s critique of the norm of public 
reason, and showed the ways in which his critique is relevant to the 
problems of corporate political speech.78
  
 75 See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 60, at 1720, 1745. 
 Kahan follows his critique 
with the offer of an alternative discourse norm that he argues is psy-
chologically realistic and more instrumentally promising than the 
norm of public reason. He urges the adoption of “expressive overde-
termination”—a norm with a somewhat cumbersome name, but one 
which is nevertheless well worth considering. Expressive overdeter-
mination has two basic elements. First, it requires political speakers to 
recognize and articulate the ways in which a policy they support ad-
vances their personal conception of what is good and meaningful in 
life. That is, where the norm of public reason requires speakers to 
 76 Fairfax, supra note 26, at 803. 
 77 Hill & O’Hara, supra note 60, at 1720. 
 78 See supra text accompanying notes 41-56. 
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keep quiet about their overarching “world-view” when talking about 
social policy, the norm of expressive over-determination demands that 
speakers explicitly acknowledge the connection between their policy 
choices and their world-view.79 Second, Kahan would require people 
to speak about a preferred policy in ways that allow other people to 
see the policy as “expressing meanings distinctive of their worldviews 
as well.”80 In order to ensure that policy proposals can be determined 
or justified through multiple world-views (i.e., that proposals can be 
“expressively overdetermined”), political speakers would be “strictly 
forbidden to engage in forms of advocacy calculated to render laws 
and policies univocal in their meanings.”81
It may be optimistic, and perhaps patronizing, to think that con-
troversial policy proposals can always “admit of multiple cultural 
interpretations.”
  
82 It seems inevitable that some kinds of proposals 
will inevitably resonate more with an “individualist” rather than an 
“egalitarian,” or vice-versa. It may be sufficient instead to tweak the 
second step of Kahan’s prescription and say that speakers should be 
required to explicitly and sincerely address the ways in which their 
preferred policy advances their own world-view and the ways in 
which it at least does not unduly threaten the world views of others. 
Such an approach still achieves the dual benefits that Kahan seeks of 
first, alerting the speaker to the biased nature of her own positions, 
and, second, disarming her interlocutors’ reasonable fears that their 
world view may be threatened by a policy advocated by someone with 
a world-view different from their own.83
  
 79 Kahan refers to this as the requirement of “expressive candor.” Kahan, 
supra note 45, at 145. 
 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. Kahan provides several examples of the utility of “expressive over-
determination” in public health regulation. For example, he argues that world-view 
conflicts had inhibited the development of sound anti-pollution policies in the 1970s 
and 1980s. To critics of the anti-nuclear power movement of those decades, “it be-
came obvious . . . that the perception of nuclear risks was a product of ‘cultural bias’ 
on the part of egalitarian collectivists whose ‘sectarian’ worldview would be affirmed 
by the gutting of the nuclear industry.” But similar biases were easily seen to be ani-
mating any given proponent of nuclear power since “risk dismissiveness suited the 
needs of the ‘market individualist,’ whose reverence for private orderings predisposed 
him [or her] to a belief in the resilience of nature and the evolutionary wisdom of 
markets.” Id. at 140. However, widespread support for emissions regulation was 
finally engendered in the 1990s because of the “expressive overdetermination” of 
innovative reforms like tradable emissions legislation. Such laws “simultaneously 
affirmed egalitarians’ commitment to environmental protection and individualists’ 
commitment to markets as a means of attaining societal ends.” Id. at 146.  
 82 Douglas Kysar, The Consultants’ Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2073 
(2008) (book review) (interpreting Kahan). 
 83 Kahan, supra note 45, at 145. 
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Kahan intends for “expressive over-determination” to be deployed 
in political discourse, where it will replace the norm of public reason. 
But his framework might be usefully installed, with alteration, as a 
discourse norm for corporate speech on behalf of multiple stakehold-
ers.84 Instead of urging directors to appeal to world-view categories, 
we might insist that they speak in a manner that explicitly makes clear 
the ways in which a proposed course of corporate action is likely to 
advance shareholder interests as well as making clear the ways in 
which the proposal would affect other groups of stakeholders. Direc-
tors would be obliged to speak with candor in terms that resonate with 
the particular interests of each of the groups. For example, they might 
speak of risks of loss and chances of profits when expressing the 
shareholders stake in corporate action, wages, working conditions, 
and job security when speaking of the consequences of a corporate 
choice for workers, and cost, quality and consumption consequences 
when expressing the intended or likely effect of a corporate decision 
on the firm’s consumers.85
Firms with fiduciary obligations to multiple stakeholders might 
also be expected to speak in an expressively over-determined fashion 
when they speak to their different constituencies through advertising, 
disclosures, or public statements. To comply with the norm, for ex-
ample, firms would be forbidden from making a statement to share-
 
  
 84 I have previously critiqued “expressive overdetermination” for its “unwar-
ranted agnosticism” regarding the content of world-views and have urged policymak-
ers to focus instead on repudiating cognitive frameworks, such as “dispositionism,” 
that we know to be false, even if they are intuitively appealing. See David G.Yosifon, 
Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
681, 724-33 (2008). Here I am concerned with pursuing the ways in which Kahan’s 
model might usefully be employed by corporations in their external and internal 
speech. 
 85 Professor Lyman Johnson’s call to authorize religious language in the 
boardroom might provide a practical adjunct to the project of expressive-
overdetermination in board governance. Lyman Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in 
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). Johnson laments what he sees as the 
impoverished quality of discourse in the corporate boardroom. Pursuing a richer 
conception of what constitutes “good faith” conduct on the part of corporate directors, 
Johnson argues that the hyper-secular nature of boardroom discourse norms precludes 
directors from drawing on the rich reservoirs of “good faith”-like language from their 
spiritual or religious traditions when they talk about what is required of themselves 
and their fellow board members. Because language abhors a vacuum, this prohibition 
leads to board-room discussions that are denuded of all the qualities of language that 
make grappling with hard questions manageable in other areas of life. Licensing a 
wider range of “good faith” vocabulary might be of practical benefit to a board deli-
berating on multiple stakeholder interests in an expressively over-deterministic fa-
shion. Johnson has in mind mostly the stories, metaphors, psalms, epigrams, and 
proverbs that are part of the world’s various religious traditions. Id. at 31-34. 
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holders about the profitability of a particular course of action without 
also expressing to consumers how their interest is implicated in the 
proposed action, and also speaking to workers about how the plans 
would affect them. The form of such speech need not be prescribed 
with nuance or particularity. Certainly a prospectus sent to sharehold-
ers need not have a section directed at consumers, and general adver-
tising to consumers need not also contain information about  
cost-of-living increases for workers in the next year. But taken as a 
whole, to comply with this prescriptive norm, the firm’s statements to 
its various stakeholders would have to express in over-determined 
fashion how each of the firm’s stakeholders stand to benefit or are 
exposed to risk by corporate decisions.  
Courts could enforce this standard only in the limited ways that 
they presently enforce fiduciary discourse standards owed to share-
holders. While courts could not enforce substantive standards or im-
pose liability for “bad” decisions for fear of undermining the authority 
and discretion of the board of directors, the overarching obligation of 
candor, completeness and good-faith is one that courts can and do 
undertake to enforce on behalf of shareholders through the mechan-
isms of shareholder derivative suits under state law. The fiduciary 
discourse obligation could similarly be enforced on behalf of other 
stakeholders through “stakeholder derivative” suits to enforce direc-
tors’ obligations to them.86
  
 86 I do not suggest that so dramatic an expansion of fiduciary obligations 
could be accomplished through judicial innovation alone. Legislative action at the 
state or federal level would be required. The detailed specification of what statutory 
language would be necessary to institutionalize multi-stakeholder corporate gover-
nance is beyond the scope of this article. My primary concern here has been with 
demonstrating, first, that such a standard is necessary, and second, that such a stan-
dard can be accomplished by altering the discourse norms that underlie corporate 
speech to and about its various stakeholders. Nevertheless, something as straightfor-
ward as the following would suffice to begin to shift corporate law dynamics in the 
desired direction if it were incorporated into state corporate law: “The board of direc-
tors shall manage the firm in the best interests of the corporation’s shareholders, 
workers, and consumers.” This kind of broad legislative innovation could then be 
fleshed out through corporate law’s traditional reliance on the courts to develop 
workable rules for particular circumstances and recurring problems, perhaps in ways 
suggested by this Article. Because states compete against each other for corporate 
chartering fees, and because shareholders benefit from the presently dominant share-
holder primacy regime, legislative reform in any one state (e.g., Delaware) calling for 
multiple-stakeholder governance is unlikely to be effective, as firms would simply 
reincorporate in a different state that seeks to benefit from chartering fees by continu-
ing to offer shareholder primacy in its corporate law. Such a “race to the bottom” 
(from the perspective of non-shareholding stakeholders) may require a move towards 
federal chartering of corporations. The federalization of corporate law has already 
been underway in piecemeal fashion, though departure from shareholder primacy has 
 Or the standard might be enforced by ex-
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tending the reach of the federal securities laws to non-shareholding 
stakeholders.87
2. Integrity in Firm Governance 
  
As noted above, since the 1930s corporate law scholars have for 
the most part been pre-occupied with the “agency problem” in corpo-
rate law.88 One of the most prominent contemporary analysts of the 
agency problem, Michael Jensen, has late in his career come to the 
conclusion that the traditional agency problem has been well-enough 
solved.89
  
not yet been on the menu. See generally Stephen Bainbridge, The Creeping Federali-
zation of Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26 (2003) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley legisla-
tion was the most dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power).  
 Jensen, working with co-authors Werner H. Erhard and 
Steve Zaffron, asserts that the more pressing contemporary problem of 
unrealized corporate value relates not to failures in the principal-agent 
relationship, but rather failures in the more intimate relationship be-
tween the agent and herself. Jensen refers to this as the problem of 
“integrity”—or the lack of integrity, in the life of the agent. What is of 
particular interest to the present inquiry is Jensen’s conclusion that the 
“integrity” of corporate agents can be improved through the adoption 
 87 Interestingly, the seminal laws creating and empowering the Securities and 
Exchange Commission actually seem to authorize the SEC to make rules in connec-
tion with the purchase and sale of securities that are generally in the public interest, 
even where “the public interest” is distinct form shareholder interests. For example, 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 makes it unlawful 
(b) [t]o use . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.  
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (both emphases added). Nevertheless, the securities regula-
tion apparatus has not yet been put to use directly in the service of most non-
shareholding workers and consumers.  
 88 See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. 
 89 See Werner H. Erhard, Michael C. Jensen, & Steve Zaffron, Integrity: A 
Positive Model that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and 
Legality (Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 10-061, 2010) 
[hereinafter Integrity: A Positive Model], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542759; see also Jensen, supra 
note 3 (explicating the integrity project). For ease of reference and because his work 
is of abiding interest to corporate law scholars, I attribute this work in the text to 
“Jensen,” while reiterating the collaborative nature of his project by reference here 
and in subsequent footnotes. Regarding the view that the traditional agency problem 
has been more or less well contained, see Jensen, supra note 3 (emphasizing the over-
lapping power of several modern solutions to the shareholder’s monitoring problem, 
including most importantly the capital markets, the law of fiduciary obligation, and 
modern compensation structures for upper-management).  
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of a different kind of discourse norm than presently prevails in corpo-
rate speech.90
By integrity, Jensen means wholeness, completeness, and cohe-
rence.
  
91 People or systems that lack integrity always underperform, 
sometimes catastrophically.92 He argues that things, processes, indi-
viduals, and relationships all have more “workability” when they op-
erate with integrity. Critics may argue that Jensen’s new project dif-
fers little from familiar concepts of efficiency and that all that is new 
here is a proposal to pursue a presently underappreciated approach to 
efficiency gains. This critique is almost inevitable given Jensen’s in-
sistence that his program of integrity is not a normative guidepost but 
an agnostic map of “workability.”93 Others might reasonably think 
that while it is nice to have Jensen in the conversation, work on the 
relationship between integrity and productivity has been a long-
standing theme in progressive—especially feminist—corporate 
theory.94
Jensen argues that the best way that individuals and relationships 
can operate with integrity is through people living by their “word.” To 
be a person of integrity a person must honor their word. Now, for Jen-
sen, honoring one’s word is not the same as keeping one’s word. To 
keep one’s word means to do or not do exactly what you say you will. 
But only a person with a very small life, and very few responsibilities, 
could possibly keep their word all of the time. For most people serv-
 I nevertheless think Jensen’s work is valuable as an illustra-
tion of this Article’s claim that discourse norms can be instrumentally 
deployed to achieve desired results in corporate operations.  
  
 90 Any prescriptive tool promising greater efficiency must meet the question 
of why the churning market, filled with greedy individuals, has not already imple-
mented it. Jensen explains the market’s failure to achieve integrity gains as a function 
of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral biases—he relies on the same literature that 
I rely on to demonstrate the futility of the shareholder primacy norm as it relates to 
non-shareholder interests. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21. The economist 
in Jensen cannot keep from associating a number with his project—he argues that 
organizations that operate with integrity in the manner he defines it will increase 
productivity by 100–500% over their non-integrity levels. Jensen also claims that in 
corporate operations 25% of unrealized productivity is attributable to the agency 
problem, 25% to the problem of co-locating information and decision-rights, 25% to 
the problem of integrity, and 25% to as-yet unknown causes. See Jensen, supra note 
3. The implausibility of this kind of quantification strikes me as unnecessarily dis-
tracting from the overall cogency and utility of his general claims. 
 91 Integrity: A Positive Model, supra note 89, at 18. 
 92 Id. at 31-41. Jensen provides examples of the adverse consequences of 
“out of integrity” behavior in numerous contexts including academics, business, and 
religious organizations. Id. at 72 & n.47, 74. 
 93 See id. at 44. 
 94 See, e.g., The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8, at 
285-93. 
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ing in complex roles, things come up, delays happen, priorities shift, 
and it is not always possible or desirable to keep the very letter of 
your word. The person who honors her word may sometimes not keep 
her word, but she will always take responsibility for remedying any 
problems caused by her failure to keep her word.95
To improve workability, Jensen argues that we should adopt a 
discourse norm in which your “word” automatically encompasses not 
only everything you explicitly promise to do, but also everything that 
other people expect of you.
  
96 You do not have to do exactly what oth-
ers expect of you, this is merely a default rule. You can opt out of this 
default by making clear to others that you will not be doing what they 
expect you to be doing. Going further, in Jensen’s system your 
“word” also by default includes what society’s ethical, moral and le-
gal codes expect of you. To be a person of integrity you must either 
honor what other people and society expects of you, or you must 
“publicly announce” that such expectations do not, after all, constitute 
your word.97
Under this system, your word runs to all of the people or groups 
with whom you want to have a workable relationship. Jensen is in 
particular concerned with the set of relationships that comprise corpo-
rate activity. Deploying his discourse norm to advance multi-fiduciary 
corporate governance would involve requiring organizational integrity 
towards shareholders, creditors, workers, and consumers. Jensen be-
lieves that directors are presently involved in a tremendous amount of 
  
  
 95 Integrity: A Positive Model, supra note 89, at 22. Jensen insists that his 
project is “ontological,” that he and his collaborators have discovered something 
fundamental about how the universe works, and how people work within it. Jensen is 
a businessman, in the end, not a philosopher or social scientist, and so at least for him 
it seems little more important to know precisely why “integrity” is powerful than it is 
to know the physics or chemistry that makes coal burnable for fuel. See id. at 19-20. 
 96 Id. at 52. 
 97 To ratchet up “workability” one more level, Jensen and his co-authors 
introduce an asymmetry into their integrity discourse norm. While your word encom-
passes everything that is expected of you, when you are thinking about someone 
else’s word your expectations regarding that other person do not, for you, count as 
their word. For you, other people’s word only includes what they explicitly say or 
agree to do. Thus, within the integrity norm you cannot assume others will honor your 
expectations of them, because your expectations do not, for you, constitute their word. 
This is so even though you must consider their expectations of you to be your word. 
See id. at 52. In the corporate context, this element of Jensen’s program should per-
haps be limited to the firm’s internal discourse on the board of directors between 
directors and officers, and between officers and employees. With respect to the firm’s 
speech to its stakeholders we may not want people to rely only on what the firm ac-
tually says it will do. Indeed, the power of fiduciary obligation in corporate gover-
nance is that it allows corporate stakeholders to put their faith in the firm without 
having to say anything or listen very much to corporate managers.  
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destructive out-of-integrity behavior in their relationships to their 
shareholders and the capital markets generally.98 This problem of out 
of integrity behavior can also be seen with respect to other stakehold-
ers. That is, in their market discourse with non-shareholding stake-
holders, corporations adhere to a far narrower conception of what 
counts as honoring their “word” than would prevail under an integrity 
regime. For a corporation to be in integrity, the firm’s directors and 
managers must internally honor their word, and must honor their word 
externally in what the firm says to, or what is expected of it by, mul-
tiple stakeholders.99
Jensen argues that an important cause of out-of-integrity behavior 
is that people mistakenly use cost-benefit analysis to decide if they are 
going to honor their word or not. While individuals and organizations 
should certainly do a cost-benefit analysis when determining what 
they will give their word to, once a word is given it should be honored 
without any further analysis of the costs of doing so. If you do a cost-
benefit analysis when it comes to honoring your word it makes you 
untrustworthy and undermines the workability of your relationships. I 
think that one of the reasons that corporate actors engage in cost-
benefit analysis at every turn is because of the lack of any other  
salient framework through which to analyze what they ought to do. 
Jensen’s integrity discourse norm provides corporate actors with a 
fresh and rich language that they can use to give shape to their sense 
of their own commitments, and how they talk about those commit-
ments to themselves and to others.  
   
It is worth noting the impressive “expressive over-determination” 
in Jensen’s invocation of the “word” in his integrity project. When I 
heard him present his idea at Stanford University in February 2010 
Jensen had the full crowd rapt as he kept invoking “your word,” “my 
word,” “living by our word.”100 For many listeners there must have 
been an inescapable religious connotation. “In the beginning, was the 
word, and the word was with God, and the word was God.”101 Chris-
tians often refer to Jesus as the embodied “Word” of God.102
  
 98 Jensen and his co-authors emphasize in particular the problem of corporate 
boards managing earnings in order to give the impression that the firm has comported 
with their own prior projections or analyst expectations. See id. at 75 n.54. 
 To philo-
 99 One source of the gains that Jensen and his co-authors expect from their 
integrity system is through the power that it has to generate trust in relationships. But 
the integrity norm is well calibrated for optimization, rather than maximization of 
trust. 
 100 See Jensen, supra note 3. 
 101 John 1:1 (Revised Standard Version). 
 102 See John 1:14 (Revised Standard Version) (“And the Word became flesh 
and dwelt among us . . . .”).  
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sophers, invocation of the term “word” invites reflection on its ancient 
etymology in the term logos, which is also a synonym for “reason.”103 
When attesting to the credibility, skillfulness, or character of another, 
we put in “a word” for them (if we are delivering a negative report 
about someone, we do not call it putting in a “word”).104 “Word” is 
used in urban slang to express agreement, concurrence, and affirma-
tion.105 Because it is infused with so much meaning to so many differ-
ent constituents, Jensen’s integrity discourse norm can help corporate 
boards develop governance dynamics which are responsive to the 
wide-ranging interests of multiple constituents.106
C. The Constitutionality of Prescriptive Discourse Norms in  
Corporate Governance Law  
  
This prescriptive discourse norms project attempts to grapple with 
the problems of corporate speech without resorting to the blunt in-
struments of censorship that the Supreme Court has forbidden.107
Moving from shareholder primacy to multi-stakeholder corporate 
governance attempts to change the way that corporations speak inter-
nally about and externally to corporate stakeholders. Regarding inter-
nal corporate dynamics, changing the fiduciary obligations of direc-
 In-
stead of imposing external restrictions on corporate commercial or 
political speech, this approach instead focuses on altering internal 
corporate governance dynamics in a way that is likely to generate 
more socially useful corporate speech.  
  
 103 See 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1113 (2d ed. 1989).  
 104 See 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 527 (2d ed. 1989). 
 105 Word, n. and int., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Dft. Rev. Mar. 
2011), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230192?rskey=DGSER5&result=1&isAdvanced=fal
se# (defining and providing the etymology of “word”). 
 106 Jensen demonstrates the power of the integrity discourse norm by embody-
ing it in the public delivery of his work. When he spoke at Stanford University, supra 
note 3, he promised in a confident staccato to deliver something new that would 
change every aspect of all of our lives. He said the integrity norm has revolutionized 
the operation of companies with which he is involved, including SSRN, which he 
founded and helps run as a private for-profit enterprise. Acknowledging that his au-
dience—comprised of business scholars, lawyers, directors and officers of publicly 
traded firms—was likely not used to “such blunt talk,” he confessed to us that he had 
cheated on his wife, had affairs that ruined his marriage and hurt his family—his 
daughter was in the room, he said she would corroborate it. He said he would have 
been a better man, a greater scholar, if he had lived his life with integrity (this is one 
of the most important business scholars of the last fifty years). He noted happily that 
it is not just SSRN which is thriving, but also his romantic relationship with a new 
partner, with whom he is in integrity. The talk is available in its entirety on the web-
site of Stanford University Law School’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance. Id. 
 107 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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tors of publicly traded corporations, and altering corporate discourse 
norms as a way of enforcing those obligations, does not run afoul of 
any First Amendment restrictions. Nobody has suggested that Smith v. 
Van Gorkom,108
From the perspective developed by this Article, enforcing a fidu-
ciary standard on external corporate speech to multiple stakeholders 
should not necessarily present First Amendment problems either. Pre-
sently corporations must adhere to fiduciary norms when speaking to 
shareholders.
 which requires directors of Delaware corporations to 
engage in informed, good-faith discourse about what kind of corporate 
conduct is in the shareholder’s best interests, is an unconstitutional 
standard on First Amendment grounds. Nor has it been suggested that 
Van Gorkom, and nothing else, is a constitutionally required standard 
for corporate speech. If prescriptive discourse would be unconstitu-
tional, then the current regime, which is highly prescriptive on its own 
terms, is unconstitutional. 
109 This standard has not been criticized on First 
Amendment grounds because it has been assumed that the fiduciary 
discourse standard is part of the private contractual obligation be-
tween shareholders and their firms, rather than an externally imposed 
government regulation.110
  
 108 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In the Van Gorkom case several directors of 
Trans-Union, Inc., a large publicly traded corporation, were found to have violated 
their fiduciary obligations to the shareholders when they sold the company for too 
low of a price. Id. at 864-70, 888. The directors were held liable not because of the 
substance of their decision, but because of their failure to become informed and to 
deliberate as a board about the value of the company and the proposed transaction. Id. 
at 893. (The company was actually sold at a substantial premium over market price, 
but the sale was pulled off in a very short amount of time, without substantial 
process). Id. at 864-70. Van Gorkom establishes the modern standard of directorial 
liability—there is no liability for substantively bad decisions, but there is liability for 
failing to deliberate about decisions in an informed, good faith-fashion.  
 I have argued that the relatively more lax 
discourse standards that presently govern corporate speech to non-
shareholders should also be seen as an implicit term in the corporate 
“nexus-of-contracts.” Altering that default term to provide for a fidu-
 109 Corporate speech to shareholders is presently heavily regulated both by 
state corporate law and federal securities laws which impose substantial disclosure 
requirements in connection with the sale of securities; such regulations have so far not 
been struck down on First Amendment grounds. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, 
Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990) (analyz-
ing application of First Amendment to the federal securities laws); Nicholas Wolfson, 
The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 265-266 (1988) (“ex-
amin[ing] the impact of the first amendment on the principal areas of SEC regulation” 
and arguing that corporate proxy statements, prospectuses, accounting statements, and 
the like are all methods of expression that should be fully protected by the First 
Amendment.).  
 110 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14. 
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ciary discourse standard for corporate speech to workers and consum-
ers should thus present no more daunting a First Amendment problem 
than does corporate law’s present embrace of such a standard for cor-
porate speech to shareholders. This article does not advocate banning 
shareholder primacy corporations or the non-fiduciary speech that 
such firms might speak to workers or consumers. Instead, it advocates 
setting the off-the-rack default terms for corporate charters in such a 
manner that would require directors of publicly traded firms to act as 
fiduciaries to multiple stakeholders, and conform their discourse to 
fiduciary standards in all corporate speech about or to such constitu-
ents. Shareholders are not entitled to the default terms of shareholder 
primacy in corporate charters. We should give the support of our pub-
lic institutions, including our corporate law, securities laws, tax laws, 
and other public advantage, to such stakeholder equality corporations. 
Nevertheless, even if one were to take the view that the First 
Amendment would forbid the imposition of fiduciary discourse stan-
dards on corporate speech to multiple stakeholders, given the latitude 
that the Supreme Court has required for corporate commercial and 
political speech,111
CONCLUSION 
 it would seem much more difficult to argue that 
government cannot prescribe corporate default terms that call for mul-
ti-stakeholder governance and concomitant fiduciary-based internal 
corporate speech about shareholders, employers and consumers. 
These permissible changes to internal corporate discourse would like-
ly be sufficient to spur significant changes over present patterns in the 
way that corporations speak to non-shareholders, without requiring 
formal, heavy-hand government enforcement of external corporate 
speech.  
Corporate speech contributes to many public policy problems, 
perhaps most obviously in the area of public health. Through advertis-
ing and other commercial speech, firms manipulate consumer percep-
tions of the risks or other consequences associated with the consump-
tion of their products. Through lobbying and other political speech 
corporations undermine the development of government regulations 
which might otherwise curb exploitative corporate conduct in the 
commercial arena. The shareholder primacy norm in corporate gover-
nance is the real culprit behind this dynamic. Corporate law tells  
directors to run their firms in the interests of shareholders alone, while 
other stakeholders are left to fend for themselves or else rely on inef-
fectual external governmental regulation. 
  
 111 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6 and 22. 
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These corporate speech problems can be solved through the 
reform of corporate law. In particular, this Article has argued that the 
pernicious effects of corporate speech can be ameliorated by extend-
ing the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors to include non-
shareholding stakeholders that are otherwise targets of corporate mis-
conduct, including employees and consumers. A multi-stakeholder 
corporate governance regime could be institutionalized by altering the 
discourse norms that underlie and give shape to corporate speech. 
Such a reform would change the way that corporate directors speak 
about various stakeholders in their internal deliberations and decision-
making, and it would change the way that firms speak to their various 
stakeholders through advertising and other externally directed speech. 
This Article has also examined a sampling of discourse norms which 
scholars, policymakers, and businesspeople might look to when insti-
tutionalizing multi-stakeholder corporate governance, including famil-
iar norms that govern personal or fiduciary engagements, as well as 
fully artificial ones, such as “expressive overdetermination,”112 or 
“integrity.”113
The reforms explored in this Article involve corporation-based, 
process-oriented solutions to the problems associated with contempo-
rary corporate speech. These prescriptions are anchored in an abiding 
faith in the fundamental process-orientation of corporate law and a 
belief that specific solutions to specific corporate problems must come 
from within our firms, rather than be imposed from the outside by 
external regulators, or law professors. As the Jensen quote at the start 
of this Article asserts, “it is only the Board that this in the end can 
come from.”
 Future work in this area may reveal other discourse 
norms that could improve the social utility of corporate speech by 
getting corporations to speak about and for the interests of all of their 
stakeholders, rather than for shareholders alone.  
114
  
 112 See supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
 It would be incongruous, therefore, to assert with any 
specificity what specific policies or innovations should or would 
emerge from multi-stakeholder corporate governance. Nevertheless, 
without violating the substantive abstention which both corporate law 
and corporate law scholarship must always embrace, it might plausi-
bly be imagined that corporate boards charged with the obligation to 
speak openly, honestly and sincerely about the interests of multiple 
stakeholders might manage their firms in such a manner as to, for 
example, forefend from artificially increasing the levels of addictive 
nicotine in the tobacco they grow for use in cigarettes, or they might 
better alert consumers of junk-food to the adverse health  
 113 See supra text accompanying notes 90-109. 
 114 Supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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consequences associated with substantial weight gain, or perhaps they 
would include more state-of-the-art environmental safeguards when 
drilling for oil in fragile ecosystems.115
  
 115 See supra note 4 (citing literature on corporate complicity in public health 
problems including the tobacco epidemic, the obesity problem, and environmental 
degradation). 
 What more to be said can only 
be said by specific corporate boards, addressing particular circums-
tances, on behalf of multiple stakeholders. 
